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Abstract
We consider a game in which a strategic defender classifies an intruder
as spy or spammer. The classification is based on the number of file server
and mail server attacks observed during a fixed window. The spammer
naively attacks (with a known distribution) his main target: the mail
server. The spy strategically selects the number of attacks on his main
target: the file server. The defender strategically selects his classification
policy: a threshold on the number of file server attacks. We model the
interaction of the two players (spy and defender) as a nonzero-sum game:
The defender needs to balance missed detections and false alarms in his
objective function, while the spy has a tradeoff between attacking the
file server more aggressively and increasing the chances of getting caught.
We give a characterization of the Nash equilibria in mixed strategies,
and demonstrate how the Nash equilibria can be computed in polynomial
time. Our characterization gives interesting and non-intuitive insights on
the players’ strategies at equilibrium: The defender uniformly randomizes
between a set of thresholds that includes very large values. The strategy of
the spy is a truncated version of the spammer’s distribution. We present
numerical simulations that validate and illustrate our theoretical results.
1 Introduction
Cybersecurity is important to businesses and individuals. According to a recent
study conducted by Symantec [1], the number of cyber attacks and threats has
increased during 2011, resulting in lost productivity, reduced revenue, and bad
reputation for the associated businesses. Different kinds of attacks (e.g., internal
unintentional actions and external malicious ones) should be treated differently
and organizations need the security intelligence to respond to all threats rapidly.
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Since only less than half of organizations are currently pursuing security issues,
there is still room for improvement. Our work contributes to the understanding
of the interaction between network operators and potential attackers.
In almost every network security situation, the administrator of a network
(defender) has limited resources in energy and time. The defender needs to
distinguish between different types of attackers (spy or spammer) and decide
whether to take actions or not. For example, an attack on a mail server by
a spammer (causing at most network congestion) should be treated differently
than an attack on a file server (possibly involving identity theft). Therefore, the
defender should employ various statistical tests, based on the observed number
of file and mail server attacks and decide upon the true type of the attacker.
Knowing that a defender is trying to classify attackers, the strategic spy is likely
to change the way he attacks in order to make it more difficult to be classified
as a spy. In this work, we analyze a simple model of such a classification game
and extract key insights.
There exists a growing body of works on the topic of intrusion detection. In a
series of papers [2, 3, 4], Alpcan and Bas¸ar present a game-theoretic analysis of a
security game between an attacker and an intrusion detection system in different
scenarios, both in finite and continuous-kernel versions. Our game-theoretic
framework focuses on attacker classification, rather than intrusion detection. In
the presence of a non-strategic player who is represented with a fixed and known
probability distribution, the defender’s task of distinguishing the true type of
the attacker becomes more challenging. It is also interesting to see how the
nonstrategic spammer influences the spy’s strategy.
In [5], Patcha and Park model the interaction between a node who might
be regular or dangerous and a defender who has some prior probability for the
existence of each type in an ad hoc network. They consider a signaling and
dynamic game with multiple stages and the players update their beliefs and
distributions based on Bayes’ rule. On the contrary, our work considers a one-
stage game with a fixed duration and we compute the Nash equilibria in mixed
strategies.
Chen and Leneutre [6] address the intrusion detection problem in heteroge-
neous networks consisting of nodes with different non-correlated security assets,
in the same way that the file and mail servers are of different importance in
our work. They consider a static game with full information and limited attack
and monitoring resources. We do not consider such limitations and we assume
asymmetric information, since the defender is not aware of the attacker’s type.
Bao, Kreidl, and Musacchio [7] also consider an intruder classification game,
in which the sequence of attacks is taken into account. While their model has
many similarities with ours, we focus on less complex (but still realistic) payoff
functions that allow us to go one step further than simulations and analyze the
structure of the Nash equilibria.
Gueye, Walrand, and Anantharam [8, 9] have investigated the structure of
the Nash equilibria in a network topology game where two adversaries select
which links to attack and defend. They consider a special case of nonzero-sum
games, in which the different term in the players’ payoffs is controlled only by
the one player. In these games, one player optimizes his payoff against the other
who has optimized his payoff as well. Such games are easier to analyze than
general nonzero-sum games, and they give interesting insights on the strategies
of the two players. Our work is using a similar payoff formulation in a different
setting: the defender selects a threshold on file server attacks (not a set of links
to defend) and there are two different types of attackers.
To the best of our knowledge, [10] is the most relevant work to ours. The
authors address the problem of classifying a malicious intruder in the presence
of an innocent user. The malicious intruder can perturb his behavior to confuse
the classifier and evade detection. But, their work focuses only on one iteration
of the game and how each player can once adjust his strategy to optimize his
expected payoff, given the optimal strategy of the other player. On the contrary,
we provide an algorithm to find the Nash equilibria of the game.
In summary, our contributions are the following. We propose a game-
theoretic model to analyze the interactions between two adversaries: a classifier
(defender) and a malicious attacker when a nonstrategic spammer is present.
We compute the Nash equilibria in polynomial time. We perform numerical
experiments that validate the theoretical computation and give non-intuitive
insights on the players’ strategies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the game
model and underlying assumptions. Section 3 explains how to reduce the com-
plexity of the game and compute the Nash equilibria in polynomial time. Sec-
tion 4 presents the performance evaluation through numerical experiments and
Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Game Model
The game model is as follows. A network consists of a defender and two servers
that are monitored for potential attacks: a File Server (FS) with sensitive data
and a Mail Server (MS) with contents of inferior importance. We assume a
constant classification window of N time slots (discrete time), during which
the defender observes the number of hits on the FS / MS coming from a single
attacker. Nature decides the type of the attacker in the network: spy or spammer
with probabilities p and 1− p respectively.
The defender is a strategic player and seeks to correctly classify the potential
intruder. He selects a threshold T . If he observes T or more hits on the FS, he
classifies the attacker as a spy; otherwise as a spammer. The spy’s goal is to
attack the FS as frequently as possible while evading detection. He is a strategic
player and selects the number of FS attacks H to launch.
The spammer is a non-strategic player with a tendency to attack more often
the MS to congest the network or annoy the defender. He attacks the FS
Z time slots with a known and fixed distribution. For instance, he can be
modeled to have a Bernoulli distribution at each time slot with a small per-
period probability θ0 of a hit on the FS.
Notational Conventions:
We use “min[v]” to denote the minimum element of a vector v, and “minimize”
when we minimize a specific expression over some constraints. We use the prime
sign (′) for transpose of matrices and vectors. All vectors are assumed to be
column vectors and are denoted by bold lowercase letters (e.g., α, β). For
matrix notation we use capital greek letters (e.g., Λ) and the indicator function
is denoted by 1cond. It is equal to 1 if “cond” holds and is equal to 0 otherwise.
The column vector of ones of length N is denoted by 1N and the matrix of
ones of dimensions N ×M is denoted by 1N×M . An overview of the important
parameters is shown in Table 1.
2.1 Spy’s cost function
The spy is detected when T ≤ H, which incurs a cost of cd to the spy. Each of
the H FS hits gives the spy a benefit of ca. We assume that the spy gains nothing
from attacking the MS. We will work with a cost function for the attacker rather
than a payoff function, thus, his overall cost function can be expressed as follows
JA(T,H) = cd · 1T≤H − ca ·H.
2.2 Defender’s reward function
The defender’s expected reward function depends on the true type of the at-
tacker.
• With probability p the defender faces a spy and classifies him correctly
when T ≤ H. The defender gains cd for the correct classification of the
spy, but loses ca per FS hit.
• With probability 1 − p the defender faces a spammer, who is incorrectly
classified as spy with probability φ(T ) = Pr{Z ≥ T}. The expected false
alarm penalty in this case is cfa · φ(T ).
Combining these two scenarios, the defender’s expected payoff is
U˜D(T,H) = p · (cd · 1T≤H − ca ·H)− (1− p) · cfa · φ(T ).
By scaling the above function, we get
UD(T,H) = cd · 1T≤H − ca ·H − µ(T ),
where µ(T ) =
1− p
p
· cfa · φ(T ).
Function φ(T ) is decreasing (since it is an complementary cumulative density
function) and we also assume that it is strictly decreasing: Pr{Z ≥ T} >
Pr{Z ≥ T + 1}.
2.3 Players’ interactions
For a fixed observation window N the spy has N + 1 available actions (attack
the file server H ∈ {0, . . . , N} times), whereas the defender has N + 2 available
actions (select T ∈ {0, . . . , N + 1} as the classification threshold). A threshold
of 0 always results in spy classification (any intruder will attack the FS at least
0 times); a threshold of N + 1 always results in spammer classification (a spy
cannot attack N + 1 times during N).
We model our problem as a nonzero-sum game. However, the defender’s
payoff is different from the spy’s cost function in only one term µ(T ) that de-
pends only on the defenders strategy (UD(T,H) = JA(T,H) − µ(T )). These
games are known as almost zero-sum games or quasi zero-sum games. We are
interested in Nash equilibria in mixed strategies for the following reason. The
spy seeks to select H just below T to evade detection. The defender aims to
select a threshold T equal to the attacker’s strategy H. Thus the players need
to mix between different strategies to make themselves less predictable. The
spy chooses a distribution α on the available numbers of FS hits — thus α is
a vector of size N + 1 with non negative elements that sum to 1. Similarly
the defender chooses a distribution β on the collection of possible thresholds T .
Thus β is a vector of size N + 2.
Let Λ˜ be a (N + 1)× (N + 2) matrix representing the spy’s strategies’ cost.
Since the number of strategies available to each player is not the same, the cost
matrix Λ˜ is not square. We express the cost matrix of the attacker as
Λ˜ = cd ·
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· 1′N+2
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with respective elements Λ˜1(i, j) = 1j≤i and Λ˜2(i, j) = i, where i = {0, . . . , N}
designates the row and j = {0, . . . , N + 1} the column.
Each row i of Λ˜ corresponds to one of the N + 1 possible spy strategies.
For instance, row “0” corresponds to spy attacking the FS 0 times (or H = 0),
row “1” corresponds to spy selecting H = 1 and so on. Each column of Λ˜
corresponds to one of the N + 2 possible defender strategies. For instance,
column “0” corresponds to defender selecting T = 0 (or always classify as spy).
In this case the spy is always detected and loses cd. The last column “N + 1”
corresponds to defender selecting T = N + 1. Since it is not possible that
that spy attacks N + 1 times during N time slots, if the defender selects this
strategy, the spy is never caught and has zero detection cost. In Λ˜2, every
column j (defender strategy) incurs the same benefit to the spy. No matter
what the decision threshold is, the impact of the spy’s attacks is the same.
Table 1: Main Notations
p probability for spy α spy’s mixed strategy
cd detection cost β def. mixed strategy
ca FS attack cost µ false alarm cost vector
cfa false alarm penalty θ(β) defendability of β
H spy’s strategy (# FS hits) Λ cost matrix of spy
T def. strategy (threshold) s first tight inequality
Z # of FS hits by spammer f last tight inequality
Let Λ˜ be defined as above, and α, β, be the spy and defender distribu-
tions respectively. The attacker cost can be written as α′Λ˜β and the defender
payoff can be written as α′Λ˜β − µ′β, where µ is a strictly decreasing vector
(component-wise) with µi be the i
th component of vector µ. Certain computa-
tions are simplified by using a matrix with only positive entries. We define
Λ = Λ˜ + (N · ca + ) · 1(N+1)×(N+2),
where 1(N+1)×(N+2) is a matrix of all ones of dimension (N + 1) × (N + 2)
and  > 0. Since α and β must each sum to 1, the expressions α′Λβ and
α′Λβ − µ′β are respectively the attacker cost and defender payoff shifted by
a constant. Adding a constant to the players’ payoff does not affect their best
responses, thus from here on we will consider these expressions to be the payoff
functions of each player.
3 Game-Theoretic Analysis
Nash proved in [14] that every finite game (finite number of players with finite
number of actions for each player) has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Our
game is finite, thus it admits a NE in mixed strategies. In a two-player game, the
players’ strategies α and β are a NE if each player’s strategy is a best response
to the other player’s mixed strategy.
3.1 Best response analysis
We will first prove a series of lemmata that will help us state and prove our
main Theorem. We first prove that in a NE, the spy’s strategy α minimizes his
cost and the defender’s strategy β maximizes his payoff.
Lemma 1. A spy who plays a best response to a defender strategy β, has a cost
δ = min[Λβ].
Proof. For a given defender strategy β and since Λ is positive, the minimum
attacker cost is achieved by putting positive probability only on strategies cor-
responding to the minimum entries of the vector Λβ. Thus the spy’s optimal
cost is δ = min[Λβ].
Definition 1 (Defendability). The defendability of a mixed strategy β is defined
as
θ(β) = min[Λβ]− µ′β. (1)
It corresponds to the defender’s payoff when the attacker plays a best response
to β.
The defendability is similar to the notion of vulnerability in [8], that is a
measure of how vulnerable a set of links is. An interesting property of the
defendability is that it depends only on the defender’s strategy and not on the
spy’s selection of α. This is due to the aforementioned “almost” zero-sum game.
We will exploit this property in the subsequent analysis.
In Nash equilibrium, each player in the game selects a best response to the
other player’s strategies. We show below (Lemma 2) that the defender’s best
response to any spy’s best response maximizes the defendability.
We proved in Lemma 1 that the best response of the spy against any defender
strategy β, gives a spy cost δ = min[Λβ]. The attacker’s optimization problem,
subject to the constraint that he limits the defender to the defendability θ(β)
takes the following form
Primal with constraints:
minimize
α
α′Λβ
subject to α ≥ 0,1′N+1 ·α ≥ 1,
α′Λ− µ′ ≤ θ(β) · 1′N+2.
(2)
The last constraint in the above LP comes from the fact that the defender’s
payoff from any pure strategy in the support of the defender’s NE strategy is
the same (and equal to the defendability), and at least as good as the payoff from
any pure strategy not in the support of his mixed strategy, when the attacker
is playing his NE strategy. The dual constrained LP is
Dual with constraints:
maximize
y,z
(−1′N+2 · θ(β)− µ′)y + z
subject to y ≥ 0, z ≥ 0
z · 1N+1 − Λy ≤ Λβ.
(3)
As we show below, the optimal value of the dual LP given by (3) is equal to
δ if and only if β is a maximizer of the function θ(β). If the optimal value
was greater than δ, then the attacker would not play a best response against a
strategy β, namely we would not be in NE.
Working on (3), the last constraint gives Λ(β + y) ≥ z · 1N+1, and since
we seek to maximize a nonnegative z with an upper limit, z = min[Λ(β +
y)]. We note here that since Λ and (β + y) are nonnegative matrix and vector
respectively, their multiplication is also a nonnegative vector and the above
optimal value for z is valid. With the above substitution for z, we get the
following LP
maximize
y
− ‖y‖θ(β)− µ′y + min[Λ(β + y)]
subject to y ≥ 0,
(4)
where we define ‖y‖ = ‖y‖1 =
N+1∑
i=0
|yi|.
Lemma 2. In NE, the defender strategy β maximizes the defendability θ(β).
Proof. Part I: Suppose that the defender’s strategy is β such that θ(β) < θ(ξ),
where ξ = arg max θ. Let y = kξ, with k  1. Then (4) gives
maximize
k
− ‖kξ‖θ(β)− µ′kξ + min[Λ(β + kξ)]
subject to k  1.
(5)
Since kξ  β, ‖ξ‖ = 1 and θ(ξ) = min[Λξ]−µ′ξ, the argument that needs to be
maximized in (5) becomes −kθ(β)+kθ(ξ) or k (θ(ξ)− θ(β)). Since θ(ξ) > θ(β),
this expression can be made arbitrarily large. Therefore, the optimal value of
(4) is infinity. Since the optimal value of the dual problem is unbounded, the
initial primal problem is infeasible [12]. Therefore, if the defendability of β is
not maximal, then β is not a NE.
Part II: Suppose that the defender’s strategy β ∈ arg max θ(λ). We show
that the optimal values of the attacker’s constrained and unconstrained LP
problem are the same, i.e., δconst = δ, where δconst is the optimal value of (2).
Since (2) is a minimization problem over a smaller set (extra constraints),
δconst ≥ δ. (6)
With the change of variable q = β+y, we transform (4) to the following problem
maximize
q
− (‖q‖ − ‖β‖)θ(β)− µ′(q − β) + min[Λq]
subject to q ≥ β.
(7)
We take now a relaxed version of the above problem, where the constraint is
q ≥ 0 instead of q ≥ β
maximize
q≥0
{−(‖q‖ − ‖β‖)θ(β)− µ′(q − β) + min[Λq]}.
Clearly the optimal value δrelax−const in the above relaxed maximization prob-
lem is greater than or equal to the optimal value δconst of the original problem
(7), since we maximize the same objective function over a larger set. Thus
δrelax−const ≥ δconst. (8)
Since ‖β‖ = 1 and δ = θ(β) + µ′β, from the above relaxed problem we get
maximize
q≥0
{δ − ‖q‖θ(β) + min[Λq]− µ′q}. (9)
But min[Λq]−µ′q = ‖q‖ · θ(q) ≤ ‖q‖ · θ(β), since β ∈ arg max θ(λ). Thus, the
maximization in (9) always gives an optimal value
δrelax−const ≤ δ. (10)
From (6), (8) and (10) we get δ ≤ δconst ≤ δrelax−const ≤ δ, which yields
δconst = δ.
Definition 2 (Tight constraint). An inequality constraint is tight, if it holds as
an equality; otherwise, it is said to be loose.
Definition 3 (Polyhedron). A polyhedron is the solution set of a finite number
of linear equalities and inequalities.
Definition 4 (Extreme point). A point x of a polyhedron is said to be extreme
if there is no x′ whose set of tight constraints is a strict superset of the set of
tight constraints of x.
Lemma 3. There exists a defender NE strategy β amongst the extreme points
of a polyhedron defined by Λx ≥ 1N+1, x ≥ 0.
Proof. As we proved in Lemma 2, in NE, the defender maximizes the defend-
ability, that is, he solves the following “defendability LP”
maximize
β,z
− µ′β + z
subject to z · 1N+1 ≤ Λβ
1′N+2 · β = 1, β ≥ 0
(11)
The solution for z is z = min[Λβ] (finite and positive since Λ positive). The
objective is a finite quantity reduced by a positive value (µ ≥ 0,β ≥ 0), thus
(11) is bounded. Consider a vector [β; z] that is both a solution to (11) and
extreme for the inequalities of (11). From the basic theorem of linear program-
ming such a point must exist. Let S be the set of indices of tight inequalities of
Λβ ≥ z · 1N+1, and P be the set of indices of tight inequalities in β ≥ 0.
Defining x := β/z, the above constraints become Λx ≥ 1, x ≥ 0, and x
is a feasible point. The same sets S and P specify the tight inequalities and
x is an extreme point of this feasible region. If it is not extreme, then there
exists a point xˆ with corresponding sets of tight inequalities Sˆ ⊇ S and Pˆ ⊇ P ,
one of which is a strict superset. Let βˆ =
xˆ
1′N+2 · xˆ
, and zˆ = min[Λβˆ]. It can
be easily shown that βˆ is a feasible point to the inequalities Λβ ≥ z1N+1, and
β ≥ 0: Indeed, Λβˆ ≥ min[Λβˆ] = zˆ, and since xˆ ≥ 0, βˆ ≥ 0. It can also be
shown that βˆ has tight inequalities in Sˆ and Pˆ . Indeed ∀j ∈ Pˆ , βˆj = 0 (thus βˆ
has tight inequalities in Pˆ ). ∀i ∈ Sˆ, xˆ has tight inequalities in Sˆ, thus [Λxˆ]i =
min[Λxˆ] = 1. We divide the last equation with 1′N+2 · xˆ (constant, can get
inside the min) and get [Λ(
xˆ
1′N+2 · xˆ
)]i = min[Λ
xˆ
1′N+2 · xˆ
]. But
xˆ
1′N+2 · xˆ
= βˆ,
thus [Λβˆ]i = min[Λβˆ], so βˆ has tight inequalities in Sˆ. Thus [βˆ, zˆ] has a strict
superset of tight inequalities to [β; z]; this is a contradiction with our hypothesis
that [β; z] was an extreme point. Thus, the defendability is maximized at the
extreme points of the polyhedron Λx ≥ 1N+1, x ≥ 0. Given an extreme point
x, we compute the distribution β = x/‖x‖. Thus, a point x = (x0, . . . , xN+1)
corresponds to a defender’s strategy β, after normalizing it.
Adding the constant parameter Nca +  to every element of Λ does not
change the structure of the Nash equilibria but renders Λ strictly positive. We
thus avoid the problems that arise when the minimum element of the vector is
zero (infinite solution).
3.2 Form of players’ strategies in NE
In this section we show how the NE in mixed strategies for the two players can
be computed in polynomial time.
3.2.1 Defender’s NE strategy
As we saw in Lemma 3, the best response strategy of the defender is found by
looking at the extreme points of the polyhedron Λx ≥ 1N+1, x ≥ 0. We call the
first type “inequality” constraints and the second type “positivity” constraints.
We have N + 1 “inequality”- and N + 2 “positivity” constraints. Writing down
the “inequality” constraints, we get
cd · x0 + (Nca + )‖x‖ ≥ 1
cd · (x0 + x1) + [(N − 1)ca + ]‖x‖ ≥ 1
...
cd · (x0 + x1 + . . .+ xN ) + ‖x‖ ≥ 1.
Our goal is to eliminate nonextreme points that are not selected by a defender
in NE, so that we reduce the number of points we have to check.
Lemma 4. Two points x1 and x2 on the polyhedron, with ‖x1‖ = ‖x2‖,
correspond to defender NE strategies β1 and β2 respectively with min[Λβ1] =
min[Λβ2].
Proof. We showed in Lemma 3 that the equation that needs to be solved in NE is
Λx ≥ 1, with ‖x‖ = 1/z = 1/min[Λβ]. Thus, if the norm ‖x‖ is preserved, the
optimal attacker cost min[Λβ] is also preserved. Hence min[Λβ1] = min[Λβ2].
Lemma 5. An extreme point x satisfies at least one tight inequality.
Proof. If none of the inequalities are tight, we scale the vector x down until one
inequality becomes tight. The new vector’s set of tight inequalities is a strict
superset of those of the original vector, thus the point with no tight inequalities
is not extreme.
Lemma 6. If ‖x1‖ = ‖x2‖ and µ′x1 < µ′x2, then x1 corresponds to a de-
fender strategy β1 with a better defendability, i.e., θ(β1) > θ(β2).
Proof. Since ‖x1‖ = ‖x2‖, min[Λβ1] = min[Λβ2] (Lemma 4). Combining the
above result with the definition of the defendability we get
θ(β1)− θ(β2) = min[Λβ1]− µ′β1 − (min[Λβ2]− µ′β2)
= µ′β2 − µ′β1.
Since µ′x1 < µ′x2, the point x1 corresponds to a defender strategy β1 with a
smaller false alarm cost, µ′β1 < µ′β2. Hence θ(β1) > θ(β2).
Lemma 7. An extreme point x corresponding to a defender NE strategy β
satisfies exactly one contiguous set (of indices) of tight inequalities.
Proof. An extreme point satisfies at least one tight inequality (Lemma 5). Sup-
pose there are two tight inequalities with indices s and f , with f > s, and that
there is at least one loose inequality (with index k) between s and f . Since k is
loose, it should be that xk ≥ cacd ‖x‖ > 0 (after subtracting the loose inequality
from the previous tight one). We make the following transformation
xˆi =

xi for i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} ∪ {k + 2, . . . , N + 1}
xi − 1 for i = k
xi + 1 for i = k + 1,
(12)
where 1 > 0 is small enough so that xˆi ≥ cacd ‖xˆ‖.
The transformation preserves the norm (‖x‖ = ‖xˆ‖), but µ′x > µ′xˆ. The
latter comes from the fact that µ′(x−xˆ) = µk ·(xk−xˆk)+µk+1 ·(xk+1−xˆk+1) =
µk ·1 +µk+1 ·(−1) = 1 ·(µk−µk+1) > 0, since µ is a strictly decreasing vector
(component-wise). Thus, from Lemma 6, xˆ corresponds to a defender strategy
with a better defendability. If there are more than one loose inequalities, we
can iteratively make the above transformation until the point xˆ has a unique
contiguous block of tight inequalities, in which case xˆ corresponds a defender
NE strategy (a defender’s unilateral change of strategy would not result in a
better defendability).
Let s and f be the indices of the first and last tight inequalities respectively.
Lemma 8. An extreme point x that corresponds to a defender NE strategy β
has zeros before s and after f + 1, i.e.,
xi = 0,∀i ∈ {0, . . . , s− 1} ∪ {f + 2, . . . , N + 1}.
Proof. We first show that xi = 0,∀i < s. If ∃i ∈ {0, . . . , s − 1}, s.t. xi >
0, we reduce xi to xˆi until either xˆi = 0 or until the i
th (previously loose)
inequality becomes tight, and increase xi+1 by the same amount. We maintain
‖x‖ constant, but we get one more tight constraint. Thus the original point
is not extreme, as we can find another point whose tight constraints is a strict
superset of those of the original.
We now show that xi = 0,∀i > f + 1. If ∃i ∈ {f + 2, . . . , N + 1}, s.t. xi >
0, we reduce xi until xˆi = 0, and increase xf+1 by the same amount. The
previously loose (f + 1)th inequality is made looser, and we keep the norm ‖x‖
constant, but xˆ has one more tight constraint, thus x was not extreme.
Lemma 9. In any Nash equilibrium, f = N.
Proof. Suppose that f < N . Subtracting the tight inequality f from the loose
inequality f +1, we get xf+1 > xm, where xm =
ca
cd
‖x‖. We make the following
transformation
xˆi =

xi for i ∈ {0, . . . , f} ∪ {f + 3, . . . , N + 1}
xm for i = f + 1
xf+1 − xm for i = f + 2.
(13)
With the above transformation we get
µ′(xˆ− x) = µf+1 · (xˆf+1 − xf+1) + µf+2 · (xˆf+2 − xf+2)
= µf+1 · (xm − xf+1) + µf+2 · (xf+1 − xm − 0)
= (xf+1 − xm) · (µf+2 − µf+1)
< 0,
since xf+2 = 0, xf+1 > xm, and µ is a strictly decreasing vector (µf+2 < µf+1).
Hence, for the new point xˆ, it holds that ‖xˆ‖ = ‖x‖, but µ′xˆ < µ′x. Thus
from Lemma 6 point xˆ corresponds to a defender NE strategy with a better
defendability. We can continue making the above transformation until f =
N , when the defender’s payoff cannot be maximized by a unilateral deviation.
Hence, in any Nash Equilibrium, f = N .
Lemma 10. An extreme point x that corresponds to a defender NE strategy β
cannot have both xs > 0 and xN+1 > 0.
Proof. In Lemmata 7–9, we proved that an extreme point x that corresponds
to a defender NE strategy satisfies a contiguous block of tight inequalities with
nonzero components between s through N + 1. We make the following trans-
formation
xˆi =

γ · xi ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , s− 1} ∪ {s+ 1, . . . , N}
0 for i = s
γ · (xs + xi) for i = N + 1,
(14)
Table 2: Defender’s strategy in NE (βm = ca/cd)
# . . . βs βs+1 . . . βN βN+1
1. 0 0 βm βm βm 1− (N − s)βm
2. 0 1− (N − s)βm βm βm βm 0
with γ =
1
1− cd · xs or, γ =
1
‖x‖[(N − s)ca + ] . The definition of γ is such
that the sth inequality is still tight after the transformation, i.e.,
γ · (cd · 0 + [(N − s)ca + ]‖x‖) = 1.
The loose inequalities before s become looser with the scaling with γ (γ > 1),
whereas the previously tight inequalities s+1 through N are still tight. Indeed,
after the above transformation, any previously tight inequality with index k ∈
{s+ 1, . . . , N} gives
γ (cd · (0 + xs+1 + . . .+ xk) + [(N − s− k)ca + ]‖x‖)
= γ (cd(xs + xs+1 + . . .+ xk) + [(N − s− k)ca + ]‖x‖)− γcdxs
(after subtracting and adding γ · cdxs)
= γ − γ · cdxs (the (s+ 1)th inequality was tight before)
= 1 (from the definition of γ).
With the above transformation, we get an extra tight constraint (xs = 0), thus
the previous point was not extreme.
Lemma 11. For an extreme point x that corresponds to a defender NE strategy
β, we only have two possible combinations
1. (0, . . . , 0, xs = 0, xs+1 = . . . = xN = xm, xN+1 ≥ 0)
2. (0, . . . , 0, xs > 0, xs+1 = . . . = xN = xm, xN+1 = 0), where xm =
ca
cd
‖x‖.
Proof. From Lemma 7, the inequalities s through N are tight. Subtracting any
tight inequality k, k ∈ {s+ 1, . . . , N} from the first tight inequality (sth), gives
xk = xm, with xm =
ca
cd
‖x‖. Also, from Lemma 8, xi = 0,∀i ∈ {0, . . . , s − 1}.
From Lemma 10, the combination xs > 0 and xN+1 > 0 is not possible, thus
the only possible forms of extreme points x that correspond to a defender NE
strategies are the ones described above.
We can now state and prove our main Theorem.
Theorem. In any Nash equilibrium the defender’s strategy β maximizes the
defendability (1). A maximizing value of β exists amongst one of the two forms
in Table 2 for some s. If there is only one maximizing β amongst vectors of the
form in Table 2, then the Nash equilibrium is unique.
Proof. The first statement of the Theorem is a direct consequence of Lemma 2.
Combining the results of Lemmata 3 and 11, we can prove the second statement.
In the first type, when xs = 0, the point x corresponds to a defender NE strategy
β with ‖β‖ = 1, thus βN+1 = 1− (N − s) ·βm or βN+1 = 0 and equivalently for
the second type, where xs > 0, we have βs = 1− (N − s) ·βm, with βm = ca/cd.
Hence, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which the defender’s strategy β has
one of the two forms in Table 2.
In the case that (N − s)βm = 1, then both cases give the same NE strategy
β = (0, . . . , β1 = . . . = βN = βm, 0). Then, (N − s)ca = cd and since s ≥ 0, the
condition that needs to be satisfied is cd ≤ Nca.
If the defendability LP (11) produces a unique maximizer β, then only one
of the above cases will maximize the defendability and therefore the Nash equi-
librium will be unique. In the case that the solution of (11) is not unique, we
could prevent ties between extreme points that vary in s by a small perturbation
to the problem (e.g., by modifying the function µ such that it produces a unique
maximizer of the defendability).
3.2.2 Attacker’s NE strategy
In mixed-strategies NE, each player is indifferent among the strategies in their
support. Thus, any pure strategy i with βi = 1 in the defender’s support yields
the same (maximum) payoff θ to the defender in NE.
We have proved that in any Nash equilibrium, the defender is playing with a
mix of strategies β that maximizes defendability. If there exists a unique maxi-
mizer β of the defendability and θˆ is the maximum defendability, the attacker’s
NE strategy α is uniquely derived by the following procedure. First construct
a sub matrix of Λ that we call Λr, by keeping only the columns that correspond
to the support of the defender’s strategy (s through N , or s+ 1 through N + 1,
or s+ 1 through N) and rows that correspond to the support of the attacker’s
strategy (s through N). The defender assigns weight to {βsˆ, . . . , βN+1}, ac-
cording to Table 2, where sˆ optimizes the defendability, The attacker assigns
positive weight to {αsˆ, . . . , αN} according to the equations
α′ = [0;α′r] (15)
α′r = (θˆ · 1′ + µ′r) · Λ−1r . (16)
This procedure gives a unique α. This α must be a valid probability distri-
bution (sum to one and have nonnegative elements) for if otherwise, it would
contradict Nash’s existence theorem.
If there are multiple choices of β that maximize the defendability (and this
can happen either when both cases in Table 2 or various selections for s in the
same case, give the same maximal defendability), from Nash’s existence theorem
(and our analysis), at least one of β will yield an α with the above procedure
that corresponds to a valid probability distribution.
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Figure 1: (Type I) Players’s best responses in NE for N = 7, θ0 = 0.1, cd =
15, ca = 1, cfa = 23, p = 0.2.
The complexity to find the NE is polynomial: O(N2) to find the defendabil-
ity, O(N) for each case, and O(N2 logN) to invert matrix Λr. Since we have
proved that β has a contiguous set of positive elements, we have reduced all the
other degrees of freedom and we make only N +1 computations for each case to
find the optimal s. For the special case that cd ≤ N · ca, the two forms coincide
and result in the same NE.
4 Numerical Results/Simulations
We conducted various experiments for different sets of parameters N, ca, cd, cfa,
and p, assuming that the spammer attacks with Bernoulli distribution with pa-
rameter θ0. We followed the procedure described above to calculate the strate-
gies of both players at equilibrium. To validate our theoretical results, we used
Gambit software [13].
Fig. 1 illustrates the first possible type for N = 7. As we can see, all the
middle points are given the same weight βm = ca/cd = 0.0667, βs = 0 and
βN+1 > βm. There exists a Nash equilibrium that matches the first row of
Table 2 with s = 1.
Fig. 2 represents the second type of Nash equilibrium strategies for N = 7.
As we can see, all the middle points are given the same weight βm = ca/cd = 0.1,
but here βs > βm (s = 0) and βN+1 = 0. Note that as p increases, larger weight
is given to the smallest threshold, in order to detect the most-probable-to-exist
spy.
In both figures we observe that the defender gives positive weight on larger
thresholds and is not focused on a range around Nθ0. Every pure strategy
(threshold) in the support of the defender’s NE strategy must give the defender
the same payoff. The attacker’s NE strategy α is such that he makes the
defender’s NE payoff for high thresholds the same as for lower ones. This is
why the defender gives positive weight to higher thresholds, even when the
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Figure 2: (Type II) Players’s best responses in NE for N = 7, θ0 = 0.1, cd =
10, ca = 1, cfa = 10, p = 0.8.
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Figure 3: Type I-II: Defender is uniform when cd ≤ N · ca. Other parameters
are N = 7, θ0 = 0.1, ca = 1, cfa = 10, p = 0.8, cd = 7.
probability that the spy will attack more than the threshold value is low.
Fig. 3 depicts the NE in which both forms coincide, i.e., when cd ≤ N · ca.
As we can see, the defender NE strategy is uniform and he never classifies the
attacker always as spy or always as spammer.
Our simulation results indicated a match between the spy and spammer.
In NE, all threshold strategies in the support of the defender give the same
payoff. When the defender selects a slightly larger threshold in his support,
the decrease in the false alarm cost matches the increase in the misdetection
cost, i.e., Pr{H = T} = cfacd
1−p
p Pr{Z = T}. Hence, the spy’s NE strategy is a
scaled version of the spammer’s distribution. For the spammer strategies that
are outside the spy’s support in NE, the spy gives zero weight. The spy’s NE
strategy is a truncated version of the spammer’s distribution, as Fig. 4 shows.
When either of p or cd or cfa is large enough, the spy could also put some weight
on the “always attack” strategy — and so that part of his strategy doesn’t look
like a truncated spammer distribution.
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Figure 4: Spy’s NE strategy is a truncated version of spammer’s distribution.
Parameters: N = 50, θ0 = 0.4, cd = cfa = 142, ca = 1, p = 0.3.
5 Conclusion
We investigated a classification game, where a network administrator (defender)
seeks to classify an attacker as a strategic spy or a naive spammer. We showed
that by taking advantage of the structure of the payoff formulation, we can
characterize and anticipate the structure of the best response strategies of the
two players in polynomial time. Our experimental results coincide with the
theoretically expected ones: The structure of the cost matrix of the spy leads to
only two forms of defender’s strategies in NE. There is a relationship between the
spammer’s distribution and the spy’s NE strategy. Furthermore, the defender
NE strategy includes a contiguous set of thresholds that always include large
values. If the parameters of the game satisfy a certain condition, the defender
is uniformly randomizing among a set of thresholds.
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